A credit mechanism is considered that selects a unique competitive equilibrium (CE) of an exchange economy. It is shown that a price normalization calling for a fixed monetary value for the total wealth in the economy and the addition of appropriate default penalties together result in a...

We show by an iterated process of price normalization that there generically exists a price-normalizing bundle that determines a credit money, such that the enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to an appropriate credit limit and default penalty for each...

This paper considers a credit mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium (CE). It is shown that in general there exists a quot;price-normalizingquot; bundle, with which the enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to appropriate penalties...

A linkage to reconcile measurable utility derived from intensity comparisons or from probability mixtures is provided in this note. This brief note is in honor of Lloyd Shapley whose relatively unknown seminal paper on measurable utility from axioms involving the fineness of perception offered a...

We show by an iterated process of price normalization that there generically exists a price-normalizing bundle that determines a credit money, such that the enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to an appropriate credit limit and default penalty for each...

We propose an intermediation core for an economy that explicitly specifies how traders organize themselves into trade cooperatives (intermediaries) and how trade between them gets carried out. The intermediation core allocations are closely related to the equilibrium allocations of a...

This paper analyzes the role of price as a signal of the quality of a monopoly firm's new product. The quality of the goods is drawn from a continuum and is unknown to consumers. We establish a unique separating equilibrium using equilibrium characterization results for signaling games. The...

We extend the notion of the inner core of a finite economy to a large economy. We prove that competitive allocations and the core coincide with the inner core.