This paper reports results from an experimental study that investigates insurance behaviours in low-probability high-loss risk situations. This study reveals that insurance behaviours may depend on the individual prior experience towards risk. It may also depend on the duration of the commitment...

This paper reports results from two experimental studies that investigate insurance behaviours in low-probability high-loss risk situations. The first study took place in France and the second one in Germany. These two studies reveal that insurance behaviours may depend on the past-experience...

We analyze a consumer-choice model with price uncertainty, loss aversion, and expectation-based reference points. The implications of this model are tested in an experiment in which participants have to make a consumption choice between two sandwiches. Participants differ in their reported taste...

The Lucas critique has been largely ignored in the marketing literature. We present a number of conditions under which the critique is most likely to (also) apply in marketing settings. Next, we provide some perspectives on how to diagnose and accommodate the Lucas critique, and identify various...

Despite many theoretical conjectures about regular drug use, illicit drug markets, and drug policy, there is a lack of relevant empirical evidence. This paper presents results of a systematic survey of regular drug users in the Swiss cities of Bern and Zürich. Its focus is on the observable...

Instrumental variable estimation requires untestable exclusion restrictions. With policy effects on individual outcomes, there is typically a time interval between the moment the agent realizes that he may be exposed to the policy and the actual exposure or the announcement of the actual...

The goal of this paper is to model an agent who dislikes large choice sets because of the "cost of thinking" involved in choosing from them. We take as a primitive a preference relation over lotteries of menus and impose novel axioms that allow us to separately identify the genuine preference...

Instrumental variable estimation requires untestable exclusion restrictions. With policy effects on individual outcomes, there is typically a time interval between the moment the agent realizes that he may be exposed to the policy and the actual exposure or the announcement of the actual...

We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time-costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable...