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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK

Renneboog, Luc; Trojanowski, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders.We find that both the CEO's industry-adjusted monetary compensation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092291

Capital Structure and Compensation Policies.

Dachraoui, K.; Dionne, G. - HEC Montréal (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 1999

We study the interaction between leverage, employment structure and compensation policies within firms.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775511

CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance.

Lausten, M. - Nationalökonomisk Institut, Institut for Økonomi - 1998

This paper examines the relationship between the replacement of CEO's and corporate performance in Danish firms. We use a unique longitudinal data set to test the hypothesis that CEO turnover is inversely related to firm performance. Evidence is provided using several measures of corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005671688

Capital Structures and Compensation Policies.

Dachraoui, K.; Dionne, G. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1999

We study the interations between leverage, employment structure and compensation policies within firms. Recent works have shown that there exists heterogeneity in compensation policies across firms (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999 and Margolis, 1996). We introduce firms' capital structure in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618898

Deregulation and the Adaption of Governance Structures: The Case of the U.S. Airline Industry.

Kole, S.R.; Lehn, K. - William E. Simon Graduate School of Business … - 1997

Deregulation provides a natural experiment for examining how governance adapts to structural changes in the business environment. We investigate the evolution of governance struture -- ownership concentration, compensation policy, and board composition -- in the U.S. airline industry during a 22...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005781237

Managerial Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Business Performance in Japan: Evidence Using New Micro Data

Sakawa, Hideaki; Watanabel, Naoki - Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University - 2009

This paper examines the relations between the disciplinary role of Japanese relationship-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, such as keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors, and pay-performance sensitivity in Japan. Previous studies show that pay-performance sensitivity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005784002

Performance Incentives, Performance Pressure and Executive Turnover

Subramanian, Narayanan; Chakraborty, Atreya; Sheikh, Shahbaz - EconWPA - 2002

We examine the relationship between the optimal incentive contract and the firm’s decision to fire a manager for poor performance. We first derive some theoretical results using a simple principal-agent model, and then examine the empirical evidence on the incidence of forced turnover among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413045

Serial CEO Incentives and the Structure of Managerial Contracts

Giannetti, Mariassunta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper analyzes the optimal contracting consequences of a recent phenomenon in the managerial labour market, CEO job hopping. I show that if the managerial labour market is thin and firm growth opportunities are weak, the optimal contract rewards the CEO for past performance through a bonus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504521