mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders.We find that both the CEO's industry-adjusted monetary compensation …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When … managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects … and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firm-level coinsurance is no …

We present a model of labor market equilibrium in which managers are risk-averse, managerial talent (‘alpha’) is scarce …, and firms seek alpha, that is, compete for this talent. When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient … long-term compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and insures low-quality managers. In contrast …