We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. Group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish. Consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from laboratory...

Payments for environmental services are a nature conservation policy in which landowners receive financial compensation conditional on verified environmental service delivery. Contracts for payments for environmental services have been found to be effective in inducing conservation on private...

The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland. This paper uses laboratory experiments to explore the performance of the AB in achieving the socially optimal land management...

The international community considers the possibility of using aid as an instrument to improve natural resource conservation in developing countries. By making the amount of transfers dependent on the efforts of the recipient countries to improve conservation, appropriate incentives can be...

Social capital is one of the main determinants of community resource management success. We use the (average) amount sent in a trust game as a measure of social capital in five rural villages in India. Combining these experimental data with household surveys we analyze: (i) how the amount sent...

We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results...