We investigate the effect of anonymous communication on generosity in a dictator game. One-way written communication from the recipient is compared with no communication. Communication increases donations by more than 70 percent (p  0.05). To separate the effect of the content of the...

This paper studies the evolution of peoplesʼ models of how other people think – their theories of mind. This is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found that,...

We exploit a unique opportunity to study how a large population of players in the field learn to play a novel game with a complicated and non-intuitive mixed strategy equilibrium.  We argue that standard models of belief-based learning and reinforcement learning are unable to explain the data,...

We develop a framework in which individuals preferences co-evolve with their abilities to deceive others regarding their preferences and intentions. We show that a pure outcome is stable, essentially if and only if it is an efficient Nash equilibrium. All individuals have the same deception...

We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begins each player may observe how his partner behaved in a few interactions in the past. We present a novel modeling approach and we show that strict Nash equilibria are always stable in such...

This paper studies categorizations that are optimal for the purpose of making predictions. A subject encounters an object (x,y). She observes the first component, x, and has to predict the second component, y. The space of objects is partitioned into categories. The subject determines what...