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has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of … the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … satiable agents, i.e., the benefit function is decreasing beyond some satiation point. In such situations externalities appear …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646228
externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of satiation points, it appears that every weighted …, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) propose the downstream incremental solution as the unique welfare distribution that is core … beyond some satiation point. In such situations externalities appear, yielding a cooperative game in partition function form …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257471
With diminishing global water reserves the problem of water allocation becomes increasingly important. We consider the problem of efficiently sharing a river among a group of satiable countries. Inducing countries to efficiently cooperate requires monetary compensations via international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005133173
With diminishing global water reserves the problem of water allocation becomes increasingly important. We consider the problem of efficiently sharing a river among a group of satiable countries. Inducing countries to efficiently cooperate requires monetary compensations via international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617059
My Back-Yard") problem. We derive and discuss conditions for core solutions to exist. These conditions are driven by the … particular, we construct a hypothetical example on a real administrative unit in which the core is shown to be empty. These …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010760348
does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550950
This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction … that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342201
This paper reinterprets by [gamma]-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction … that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043417
the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with that problem … is convex: its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement: no … that only one welfare distribution in the core satisfies this condition: its marginal contribution vector corresponding to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696235
, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classical core concept …, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A … achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734790