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We characterize the Pareto-frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation. We show how the second-best frontier which incorporates incentive constraints due to private information on productive abilities relates to the first-best frontier which takes only resource constraints into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877911
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779412
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009137112
We study political competition in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation. The analysis is made tractable by exploiting the mechanism design formulation of the Mirrleesian problem. We consider basic variants of the Downsian model such as vote-share maximizing politicians, a winner-take-all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010679135
We analyze whether banking supervision responsibilities should be concentrated in the hands of a single supervisor. We find that splitting supervisory powers among different supervisors is a superior arrangement in terms of social welfare to concentrating them in a single supervisor when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010599321
Discriminatory programs that favor local and small firms in government procurement are common in many countries. This paper studies the long-run impact of procurement discrimination on market structure and future competition in industries where learning-by-doing makes incumbent firms more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010578155
This stimulating and original Handbook offers an updated and systematic discussion of the relationship between central banks, financial regulation and supervision after the global financial crisis.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011182561
Nous étudions la fourniture d?un bien public par un gouvernement comprenant deux niveaux d?administration : d?une part, le chef du gouvernement, un planificateur bienveillant, et, d?autre part, des bureaucrates. Nous supposons que, par rapport au chef du gouvernement, les citoyens disposent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187994
We characterize the second-best public-goods provision rule with an inequality-averse principal. Our main results show how the provision rule reacts to variations of an exogenous budget available for public-goods provision when the principal exhibits different levels of inequality aversion.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189558