The article makes a literature review on the theory of Leniency Programs for cartels prosecution. We focus on how these … programs affects cartel stability through detection and deterrence. On the base of the main contributions, we build a unified …

whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices …: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …

Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority …. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust … destabilize and deter cartels by (a) protecting agents that defect (and report) from fines; (b) protecting them from other agents …

-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …This paper experimentally analyzes the cartel coordination challenge induced by the discrimination of cartel … ringleaders in leniency policies. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of a cartel. A leniency …

makes cartels that do form more stable: subjects use the possibility to report the cartel as an additional stick to control … not affect the average winning bid, nor the average winning cartel bid. The program does deter cartel formation, but it … cartel members. In fact, cartel defection is the sole reason for designated and non-designated winners to report the cartel …