We study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences (e.g., engage in campaign spending). The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization--the closer platforms are, the more valence affects the election outcome. Consequently, candidates...

In Chapter 1, I study the efficiency properties of competitive search equilibria in economies with informational asymmetries. Employers and workers are both risk-neutral and ex-ante homogeneous. I characterize an equilibrium where employers post contracts and workers direct their search towards...

This thesis is a collection of essays on the effects of trade and capital flows in developing countries. Chapter 1 starts with the observation that institutions - contract enforcement, property rights, investor protection, and the like - have received a great deal of attention in recent years. I...

Chapter 1 analyzes Pareto optimal non-linear taxation of profits and labor income in a private information economy with endogenous firm formation. Individuals differ in both their skill and their cost of setting up a firm, and choose between becoming workers and entrepreneurs. I show that a tax...

This thesis studies two strategies that households may use to keep their consumption smooth in the face of fluctuations in income and expenses: credit (borrowing and savings) and insurance (state contingent transfers between households). The first chapter asks why insurance among households in...