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Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment
Abbink, Klaus; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike - 2002
This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263068
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Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption
Abbink, Klaus - 2000
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317635
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An Experimental Bribery Game
Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Renner, Elke - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2 … negative externalities have no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reduces corruption, although discovery …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968325
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Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption
Abbink, Klaus - University of Bonn, Germany - 2000
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968346
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Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment
Abbink, Klaus; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002
This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989620
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Staff Rotation: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption?
Abbink, Klaus - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999
The German federal government intends to introduce regular staff rotation as a precautionary measure against corruption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032164
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Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption
Abbink, Klaus - 2000
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538846
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Corrupt Police
Abbink, Klaus; Ryvkin, Dmitry; Serra, Danila - 2018
corruption in a social dilemma setting where citizens simultaneously choose whether to obey the law or to break the law and …-breakers or, in treatments with corruption, extort bribes from any citizen. In the first study, we find that the presence of … reducing police corruption, both of which are based on society-wide police performance measures and not on the observation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014111686
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Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game
Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652414
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The Donor Problem
Abbink, Klaus; Ellman, Matthew - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851320