Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 68
Cover Image
Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346883
Cover Image
Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673357
Cover Image
Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups'
Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger - Georgetown University, Department of Economics - 2000
We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived … by means of communication. When communication is costless and messages are sent simultaneously, communication mechanisms … or protocols exist that sustain the same set of equilibrium payoffs as in the standard repeated game. When communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008918486
Cover Image
Price Discrimination Through Communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2011
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246715
Cover Image
Persuasion and dynamic communication
Sher, Itai - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1
A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738407
Cover Image
Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681
Cover Image
Persuasion and dynamic communication
Sher, Itai - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 99-136
A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599506
Cover Image
Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599549
Cover Image
Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - 2011
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286976
Cover Image
Communication and Learning
Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160