We analyze the effect of consumer information on firm pricing in a model where consumers search for prices and matches with products. We consider two types of consumers. Uninformed consumers do not know in advance their match values with firms, whereas informed consumers do. Prices are lower the...

We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information, price information, and...

Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while profits rise. With enough quality asymmetry, though, the higher-quality (and hence larger) firm's price...

We characterize the product line choice and pricing of a monopolist from the upper envelope of net marginal revenue curves to the individual product demand functions. The equilibrium product line constitutes those varieties yielding the highest upper envelope. In a generalized vertical...

Regulation of television advertising typically covers both the time devoted to commercials and restrictions on the commodities or services that can be publicized to various audiences (stricter laws often apply to children’s programming). Time restrictions (advertising caps) may improve welfare...

Empirical evidence suggests that most advertisements contain little direct informa- tion. Many do not mention prices. We analyze a firm'ss choice of advertising content and the information disclosed to consumers. A firm advertises only product informa- tion, price information, or both; and...

Consumer information on products affects competition and profits. We analyze firms' decisions to impart product information through advertising: comparative advertising also allows them to impart information about rivals' products. If firms sell products of similar qualities, both want to...

We study "opaque" selling in multiproduct environments - a marketing practice in which sellers strategically withhold product information by keeping important characteristics of their products hidden until after purchase. We show that a monopolist will always use opaque selling, but it is not...

Empirical evidence suggests that most advertisements contain little direct information. Many do not mention prices. We analyze a monopoly firm's choice of advertising content and the information disclosed to consumers. The firm advertises only product information, price information, or both; and...

This paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry. Advertising levels may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of programs, and the expected benefits to...