failure in the industry. Advertising levels may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost to viewers, the …

We develop an empirical study of the information–persuasion trade-off in advertising using data on the information …

We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting … consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over … quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is …

Advertising competes for scarce consumer attention, so more profitable advertisers send more messages to break through …

platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like advertising,advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned. …

Regulation of television advertising typically covers both the time devoted to commercials and restrictions on the … restrictions (advertising caps) may improve welfare when advertising is overprovided in the market system. Even then, such caps may … (including the direct benefit to viewers). Restricting advertising of particular products (such as cigarettes) likely reflects …

Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. ?Junk? mail, ?spam? e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both …

Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. “Junk” mail, “spam” e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both …

We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting … consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over … quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is …