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On the collusive nature of managerial contracts based on comparative performance

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 74 (2020) 1, pp. 12-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012590220

Strategic delegation and the shape of market competition

Lambertini, Luca - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000958123

Industry dynamics á la Stackelberg with stochastic capital accumulation

Lambertini, Luca - In: Entrepreneurship, growth, and innovation : the dynamics …, (pp. 23-39). 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003330928

Dynamic oligopoly with capital accumulation and environmental externality

Dragone, Davide; Lambertini, Luca; Palestini, Arsen - In: Dynamic systems, economic growth, and the environment, (pp. 197-214). 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003917141

R&D incentives under Bertrand competition : a differential game

Cellini, Roberto (contributor); Lambertini, Luca (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002419477

Merger without cost advantages

Huck, Steffen (contributor); Konrad, Kai A. (contributor); … - 2005

The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as...