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Chapter Twenty-Five. Strategyproof Social Choice

Barberà, Salvador - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 2, (pp. 731-831). 2011

This chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025183

Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice

Barberà, Salvador - In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318729

Strategy-proof social choice

Barberà, Salvador - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773120

Strategy-proof social choice

Barberà, Salvador - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584608

Intermediate condorcet winners and losers

Barberà, Salvador; Bossert, Walter - 2023 - This version: January 10, 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014310405

Voting by Committees under Constraints

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2001

characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773124

Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael B.; Shalev, Jonathan - 1998

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for a fixed number of periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period;...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608403

Voting by Committees under Constraints

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584607

Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution

Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael; Shalev, Jonathan - EconWPA - 1998

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for $k$ periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118533

On the weights of nations : assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union

Barberà, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O. - 2004

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602899