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Relative Performance or Team Evaluation? Optimal Contracts for Other-Regarding Agents

Bartling, Björn - 2010

This paper derives optimal incentive contracts for agents with other-regarding preferences. It offers a behavioral explanation for the empirically observed lack of relative performance evaluation. We analyze a principal-multi agent model and assume that agents are inequity averse or status...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224219

Reference points, social norms, and fairness in contract renegotiations : conference paper

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2013

-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843

Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations

Bartling, Björn - 2014

How does an ex ante contract affect behavior in an ex post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical … buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a … bargaining threat points. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065729

Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse … a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598089

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung … - 2010

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008623439

Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860227