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The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success diminishes gradually with the arrival of additional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791971
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Experimentation in Markets
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593440
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Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996
The diffusion of a new product of uncertain value is analyzed in a duopolistic market in continuous time. The two sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product over time as a result of experimentation. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463873
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The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two financing modes, namely relationship financing, where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable, and arm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196057
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Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
learning and turnover among buyers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990828
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The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success gradually diminishes with the arrival of addtional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087360
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Market Experimentation and Pricing
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996
We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product … externality leads to too much learning. Buyers do not consider the impact of their experimentation on other buyers while the … and allocations in this two-sided learning model. The analysis is presented for a finite number of buyers as well as for a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093954
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Should Auctions be Transparent?
Bergemann, Dirk; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct disclosure regimes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511590
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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255267
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Should Auctions Be Transparent?
Bergemann, Dirk; Hörner, Johannes - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct disclosure regimes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611021