In this work we study the case of agents willing to engage in a Renewable Energy Community (REC). The municipality – being the promoter of the REC – burdens all the investment costs (RE plants, storage, local grid interventions) and entrusts an aggregator of its operation paying a fixed...

In this work we study the case of agents willing to engage in a Renewable Energy Community (REC). The municipality - being the promoter of the REC - burdens all the investment costs (RE plants, storage, local grid interventions) and entrusts an aggregator of its operation paying a fixed tariff....

In this work we study the case of agents willing to engage in a Renewable Energy Community (REC). The municipality – being the promoter of the REC – burdens all the investment costs (RE plants, storage, local grid interventions) and entrusts an aggregator of its operation paying a fixed...

We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct disclosure regimes...

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct disclosure regimes...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes a relationship between the set...

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...