In this note, we intend to characterize conditions such that adverse selection is irrelevant in health insurance. We show that a condition is that policyholders health status is sufficiently reduced by illness.

This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard....

This paper investigates the impact of chronic diseases on insurance contracts with adverse selection. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the introduction of chronic diseases influences the equilibrium of insurance market. We characterize conditions...

In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal...

In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal...

Dans cet article, nous considérons une relation bilatérale entre un décideur et un expert dans laquelle l’expert observe de manière privée un paramètre représentant un état de la nature. L’expert possède un biais décisionnel qui le conduit à toujours préférer une décision...