In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle. In particular, supposing that individuals and...

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric rules and for the existence...

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and...

Under the assumption that individual preferences are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the social choice functions which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives are exogenously partitioned into...