This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but nontrivial,...

The following is proven here: let W : X × C ? R, where X is convex, be a continuous and bounded function such that for each y?C, the function W (·,y) : X ? R is concave (resp. strongly concave; resp. Lipschitzian with constant M; resp. monotone; resp. strictly monotone) and let Y?C. If C is...

In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than...

We show that, even under incomplete markets, the equilibrium manifold identifies individual demands everywhere in their domains. For this, we assume conditions of smoothness, interiority and regularity, and avoid observational requirements at the individual level. It is crucial that there be...

This note shows that the testability result obtained by Brown and Matzkin (1996) for an exchange economy survives the introduction of standard, aggregate production, even without the observation of production levels.

The theory of general equilibrium was criticized for its apparent lack of testable implications, as seemingly implied by the results of Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu in the Seventies. This view was challenged by the results of Brown and Matzkin (1996), which showed the existence of testable...