In auctions a seller offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue. In fair division games the object is collectively owned by the group of bidders who equally share the revenue. We run an experiment in which the participants face four types of allocation games (auctions and fair division...

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...

This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Bulgaria and Germany, with different allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value-contests compares the bid functions, some features of...

This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Bulgaria and Germany, with different allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value-contests compares the bid functions, some features of...

Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring...