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Insurance and Saving: Some Further Results
Dionne, G.; Eeckhoudt, L. - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 1982
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729891
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Insurance Fraud Estimation: More Evidence from the Quebec Automobile Insurance Industry
Caron, L.; Dionne, G. - HEC Montréal (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 1996
This article follows a previous study on insurance fraud in the Quebec automobile insurance industry (Dionne and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618703
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The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud.
Dionne, G. - HEC Montréal (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2000
We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Two of them are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618705
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The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard: Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance.
Dionne, G.; Maurice, M.; Pinquet, J.; Vanasse, C. - HEC Montréal (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2001
automobile insurance are examples of contracts that use memory. During the eighties different contributors (Lambert, 1983 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618718
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Non-Convexities and Efficiency of Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information.
Dionne, G.; Fombaron, N. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618907