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Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping within a tournament game between two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010370525
Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping or cheating within a tournament game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003377751
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Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping or cheating within a tournament game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267284
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001241148
In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers according...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538870
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539759
This paper discusses the properties of stylized U.S. (U-type) and Japanese tournaments (J-type), which can both solve the unverifiability problem of labor contracts. Under a zero-profit condition, both tournament types will yield first-best efforts if workers are homogenous and risk neutral....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539888
In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011540069
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