Similar Search Results

Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully … awarded stock options, why incentive pay is usually lower in non-profit organizations, and higher in larger firms. Envy may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261264

Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325487

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013

Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326509

Paid to Quit

Dur, Robert; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431184

Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - CESifo - 2004

his employer. This paper uses a principal-agent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker’s effort is fully … awarded stock options, why incentive pay is usually lower in non-profit organizations, and higher in larger firms. Envy may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765867