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Optimal Incentive Contracts for a Worker Who Envies His Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2021
his employer. This paper uses a principal-agent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profit-sharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully … awarded stock options, why incentive pay is usually lower in non-profit organizations, and higher in larger firms. Envy may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318976
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Optimal Incentive Contracts When Workers Envy Their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
his employer. This paper employs a principal-agent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profit-sharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully … awarded stock options, why incentive pay is usually lower in non-profit organizations, and higher in larger firms. Envy may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029345
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The Desire for Impact
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2021
This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make firms in a competitive labor market act as monopsonists, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different wages, may alleviate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318957
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Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - 2021
motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319192
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Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - 2004
motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071384
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325487
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Paid to quit
Dur, Robert; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326509
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Paid to Quit
Dur, Robert; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2015
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431184
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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully … awarded stock options, why incentive pay is usually lower in non-profit organizations, and higher in larger firms. Envy may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261264
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Paid to Quit
Dur, Robert - 2016
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents' commitment to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001146