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A two-sided reputation result with long-run players

Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 1, pp. 376-392

We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042918

Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games

Atakan, Alp Enver; Ekmekci, Mehmet - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

monitoring structure, we prove a reputation result for repeated moral hazard games: if there is positive probability that player …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113383

Impermanent types and permanent reputations

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Gossner, Olivier; Wilson, Andrea - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 162-178

We study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long-run player in the classical reputation model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010582586

Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets

Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2010

bargaining game with one-sided reputation, the terms of trade are determined by the commitment types on the short side, and … equilibrium play in a bargaining game with two-sided reputation and commitment types cause inefficiency. An inefficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804605

Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Gossner, Olivier; Wilson, Andrea - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2010

We study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long-run player in the classical reputation model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804912

Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring

Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2009

structure, we prove a reputation result for games with locally nonconflicting interests or games with strictly conflicting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804918

Reputation in Long-Run Relationships

Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2009

We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2’s type is commonly known. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804920

A two Sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Atakan, Alp - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2009

, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In this note we show that this conjecture is indeed true for a wide set … of stage games for which the one-sided reputation result of Atakan and Ekmekci (2008) holds.. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804921

Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring

Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 553-605

monitoring structure, we prove a reputation result for stage games with a strong Stackelberg action: if there is positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263579

Reputation with long run players and imperfect observation

Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2009

Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount … reputation result. If player 1 is a particular commitment type with positive probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282883