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When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? : the prisoner's dilemma as a game of multiple motives
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2012 - revised version: August 2013
, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of five motives: the size of gains from cooperation, expectations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009573481
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Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? : an experimental study on "Broken (and Fixed) Windows"
Engel, Christoph; Kube, Sebastian; Kurschilgen, Michael - 2011
Cooperation problems are at the heart of many everyday situations. In this paper, we propose a very simple and light …-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation … in natural settings. -- Public Good ; Behavioral Uncertainty ; Conditional Cooperation ; Information ; First Impressions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009007141
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When is the Risk of Cooperation Worth Taking? The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Game of Multiple Motives
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2013
, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of five motives: the size of gains from cooperation, expectations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166486
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Harm on an innocent outsider as a lubricant of cooperation : an experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2012
externality. A within-subjects measure of reticence to impose harm does not explain cooperation. But the externality makes … participants more pessimistic. However conditional on their beliefs participants are more, not less cooperative if cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490177
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What does “clean” really mean? The implicit framing of decontextualized experiments
Engel, Christoph; Rand, David G. - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 3, pp. 386-389
neutral language. Here we show that cooperation in such a neutrally framed Prisoner’s Dilemma is equivalent to a PD framed as … contributing to a cooperative endeavour. Conversely, there is substantially less cooperation in a PD framed as a competition. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041589
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We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision
Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009
Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels whenever actors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614920
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When is the Risk of Cooperation Worth Taking? The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Game of Multiple Motives
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012
, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of five motives: the size of gains from cooperation, expectations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686926
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Words Substitute Fists – Justifying Punishment in a Public Good Experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013
Punishees regularly ask for justification. But is justification also effective? To answer this question under controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does not benefit from contributions to the public good....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731963
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Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment
Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013
, but inequity is not pronounced enough to sustain cooperation; (b) heterogeneous preferences are common knowledge; (c … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667903
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Social preferences can make imperfect sanctions work: Evidence from a public good experiment
Engel, Christoph - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 343-353
Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I test the hypothesis that imperfect sanctions may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using a linear public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116856