Showing 1 - 10 of 133
as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663188
The …xed rate tender is one of the main operational formats usedby central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. Whileacademic research has largely dismissed the procedure for its tendency to en-courage overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of Englandhave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009522185
The fixed rate tender is one of the main operational formats used by central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. While academic research has largely dismissed the procedure for its tendency to encourage overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of England have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008797780
dimension as its support, which may be seen as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489976
as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969046
as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011640552
The fixed rate tender is one of the main procedures used by central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. While academic research has largely dismissed the procedure owing to its tendency to encourage overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of England have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574829
Some of the most beautiful results in mechanism design depend crucially on Myerson's (1981) regularity condition. E.g., the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main results. First, an interpretation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208360
Some of the most beautiful results in mechanism design depend crucially on Myerson?s (1981) regularity condition. E.g., the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main results. First, an interpretation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988914
This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969190