In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of 'yes man' behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993) argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off...

In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of "yes man" behavior in organizations, Prendergast [American Economic Review 83 (1993) 757-770] argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This...

Optimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach. The present analysis relies instead on the construction of an "upper envelope" over all incentive compatibility conditions. lt turns out that the first-order approach is not innocuous. For example, in...

Optimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach. The present analysis relies instead on the construction of an "upper envelope" over all incentive compatibility conditions. It turns out that the first-order approach is not innocuous. For example, in...