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Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification
KOESSLER, Frédéric; FORGES, Françoise - In: Annales d'Economie et de Statistique (2008) 89, pp. 3-61
This paper surveys the main models of strategic information transmission. First, we study cheap talk games, i.e., direct communication games in which messages are costless and unverifiable. Then, we analyze persuasion games, in which players' information is certifiable. Finally, we show in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008619321
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An approach to communication equilibria
FORGES, Françoise - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693946
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Repeated games with incomplete information
FORGES, Françoise - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010694018
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Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals
FORGES, Françoise - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010694048
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Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero sum
FORGES, Françoise - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010694177
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Correlated equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games
FORGES, Françoise - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010694222
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Can sunspots replace a mediator?
FORGES, Françoise - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010694268
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Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete informations
FORGES, Françoise - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010694317
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Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: a model with verifiable types
FORGES, Françoise - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010694449
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Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
FORGES, Françoise; HEIFETZ, Aviad; MINELLI, Enrico - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010694556