Precedents can facilitate successful coordination within groups by reducing strategic uncertainty, but they may lead to … coordination failure when two groups with diverging precedents have to interact. This paper describes an experiment to explore how … such coordination failure can be mitigated and whether subjects are aware of it. In an initial phase, groups were able to …

Precedents can facilitate successful coordination within groups by reducing strategic uncertainty, but they may lead to … coordination failure when two groups with diverging precedents have to interact. This paper describes an experiment to explore how … such coordination failure can be mitigated and whether subjects are aware of it. In an initial phase, groups were able to …

Precedents can facilitate successful coordination within groups by reducing strategic uncertainty, but they may lead to … coordination failure when two groups with diverging precedents have to interact. This paper describes an experiment to explore how … such coordination failure can be mitigated and whether subjects are aware of it. In an initial phase, groups were able to …

coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered … welfare losses and exert negative externalities on agents, who do not receive extrinsic signals. -- coordination games …

coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered … extrinsic signals. -- Strategic Uncertainty ; coordination games ; sunspot equilibria ; irrelevant information …

experiment whether gossip affects the efficiency of human interactions. We let subjects play a trust game. Third parties observe … possibility of gossip is highly efficiency-increasing compared to a situation without any gossip. In two further control … treatments, we show that the mere fact of being observed by third parties cannot explain the efficiency-increasing effect of …

experiment whether gossip affects the efficiency of human interactions. We let subjects play a trust game. Third parties observe … possibility of gossip is highly efficiency-increasing compared to a situation without any gossip. In two further control … treatments, we show that the mere fact of being observed by third parties cannot explain the efficiency-increasing effect of …

experiment whether gossip affects the efficiency of human interactions. We let subjects play a trust game. Third parties observe … possibility of gossip is highly efficiency-increasing compared to a situation without any gossip. In two further control … treatments, we show that the mere fact of being observed by third parties cannot explain the efficiency-increasing effect of …

experiment whether gossip affects the efficiency of human interactions. We let subjects play a trust game. Third parties observe … possibility of gossip is highly efficiency-increasing compared to a situation without any gossip. In two further control … treatments, we show that the mere fact of being observed by third parties cannot explain the efficiency-increasing effect of …