The preemptive role of capital is analysed in a class of two-player symmetric capital accumulation differential games with reversible investment. It is proved that, in the medium run, the firm with better initial condition exploits its advantage when the game features feedback substituability....

In the context of capital accumulation games this paper proposes two concepts that describe the interactions between agents and give a counterpart, in a symmetric infinite horizon framework, of the well known Fudenberg and Tirole's Taxinomy concerning investment strategies in two-stage games.

L'adoption d'une Banque centrale commune modifie la structure des relations strategiques entre les autorites fiscales et monetaires. Cet article etudie, dans un cadre dynamique, comment une telle recomposition affecte a long terme les grandeurs macroeconomiques deficits, seigneuriages et dettes....

In economic two players games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash Equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule has to be amended if the game features strategic substituability.

Dans un jeu differentiel d'accumulation de capital a deux joueurs avec investissement reversible nous proposons une methode simplificatrice pour calculer l'equilibre de Nash en boucle ouverte. nous calculons aussi la solution centralisee et nous comparons les deux resultats a travers leurs...