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Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a global emission game when players are impatient
Finus, Michael - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 12 (1998) 3, pp. 275-306
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001254381
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A convention on greenhouse gases : the impact of instrumental choice on the success of negotiations
Endres, Alfred - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013409058
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International environmental agreements : how the policy instrument affects equilibrium emissions and welfare
Endres, Alfred - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013409068
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Game theory and international environmental co-operation: A survey with an application to the Kyoto-Protocol
Finus, Michael - 2000
First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings which help to explain the difficulties of co-operation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608649
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Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control
Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - 2001
We extend the work on coalition formation in global pollution control by allowing for multiple coalitions. Equilibrium coalitions are derived under different
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608805