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Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

systematically examine the determinants of informal sanctions by a large number of experiments. Our findings show that the violation … future material benefits. While non-strategic sanctions are of major importance in our experiments, strategic sanctions seem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627991

A Theory of Reciprocity

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627997

A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; von Rosenbladt, Bernhard; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003

Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and self-selection biases. The usefulness of … method integrating interactive experiments and representative surveys thereby overcoming crucial weaknesses of both … approaches. One of the major advantages of our approach is that it allows for the integration of experiments, which require …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761956

A nation-wide laboratory: Examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioral experiments into representative surveys

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; von Rosenbladt, Bernhard; … - Fakultät Wirtschaft und Management, Technische … - 2003

Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and selfselection biases. The usefulness of … method integrating interactive experiments and representative surveys thereby overcoming crucial weaknesses of both … approaches. One of the major advantages of our approach is that it allows for the integration of experiments, which require …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008526892

Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators’ punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703785

Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2003

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178144

The impact of monetary policy on stock market bubbles and trading behavior: Evidence from the lab

Fischbacher, Urs; Hens, Thorsten; Zeisberger, Stefan - In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37 (2013) 10, pp. 2104-2122

We investigate the effect of monetary policy on stock market bubbles and trading behavior in experimental asset markets. We introduce the possibility of investing in interest bearing bonds to the widely used laboratory asset market design of Smith et al. (1988). Treatment groups face a variable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010682460

Disadvantageous lies in individual decisions

Utikal, Verena; Fischbacher, Urs - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 85 (2013) C, pp. 108-111

We present experimental evidence on the existence of lies which are disadvantageous to the person lying in individual decision problems. Potential reasons for this behavior are preferences for manipulating others’ perceptions or preserving a positive self-perception. If the utility gained from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608205

Driving forces behind informal sanctions

Falk, Armin (contributor); Fehr, Ernst (contributor); … - 2005

This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003031484

Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014123017