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Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2021

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321364

Disadvantageous lies in individual decisions

Utikal, Verena; Fischbacher, Urs - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 85 (2013) C, pp. 108-111

We present experimental evidence on the existence of lies which are disadvantageous to the person lying in individual decision problems. Potential reasons for this behavior are preferences for manipulating others’ perceptions or preserving a positive self-perception. If the utility gained from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608205

Taking the initiative. What characterizes leaders?

Bruttel, Lisa; Fischbacher, Urs - In: European Economic Review 64 (2013) C, pp. 147-168

Taking the initiative is a crucial element of leadership and an important asset for many jobs. We assess this element of leadership in a game in which it emerges spontaneously since people have a non-obvious possibility to take the initiative. We can show that leadership in this game correlates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729777

Informal Sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

systematically the determinants of informal sanctions by a large number of experiments. Our findings show that the violation of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014144647

Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2004

systematically examine the determinants of informal sanctions by a large number of experiments. Our findings show that the violation … future material benefits. While non-strategic sanctions are of major importance in our experiments, strategic sanctions seem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014123017

Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market

Fischbacher, Urs; Thöni, Christian - 2004

markets with the help of experiments and show that there are even more inefficient entries than predicted by the Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014125725

Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans

Kosfeld, Michael; Heinrichs, Markus; Zak, Paul J.; … - 2005

Trust pervades human societies. Trust is indispensable in friendship, love, families and organizations, and plays a key role in economic exchange and politics. In the absence of trust among trading partners, market transactions break down. In the absence of trust in a country's institutions and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064047

A Nation-Wide Laboratory : Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; von Rosenbladt, Bernhard; … - 2023

Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and self-selectionbiases. The usefulness of … major advantages of our approach is that it allows for the integrationof experiments, which require interaction among the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014255643

A Nation-Wide Laboratory : Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Survey

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; von Rosenbladt, Bernhard; … - 2003

Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and selfselection biases. The usefulness of … method integrating interactive experiments and representative surveys thereby overcoming crucial weaknesses of both … approaches. One of the major advantages of our approach is that it allows for the integration of experiments, which require …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014088546

Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators’ punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703785