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A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule
Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Département des Sciences Économiques, École des … - 1998
We use a principal-agent framework to reexamine the implications of the negligence and strict liability rules when the tort-feasor is an agency. We assume a unilateral care situation and consider both the cases of moral hazard and of adverse selection. In both instances the negligence rule is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827179
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Incentives in Multi-Period Regulation and Procurement: A Graphical Analysis
Dionne, Georges; Fluet, Claude - Département des Sciences Économiques, École des … - 1995
Cet article analyse les politiques de réglementation et d'achat public sur plusieurs périodes en présence d'asymétrie d'information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827201
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Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2011
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009386559
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Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395943
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Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2011
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009276043
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Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders: Relying on the Information of Others
Fluet, Claude; Garella, Paolo G. - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2013
efficiently react to information? We show that the precision of information plays an essential role. Foreclosing by one lender is … other lenders receive more precise information. We develop a Bayesian game where signals of different precision are randomly … pattern of information. However this is a second-best outcome, given that private information cannot be optimally shared. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693194
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Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2013
Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs’ attorneys offer contingent fees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702340
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Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2013
Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs' attorneys offer contingent fees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702352
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Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs' attorneys offer contingent fees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084598
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Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 30 (2012) 4, pp. 352-360
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573874