The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d?Aspremont and …

) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function …

over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore …, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every …

incentive compatibility constraints : the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well …–behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms. …

We identify particular exchange economies with asymmetric information in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is … restriction to a specific class of economies are crucial for the result. Indeed, the ex ante incentive compatible core can be …

In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function … core-stable. …

) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not … mechanism. An example shows that, if the bidders’ information partitions are not connected, rings may no longer be core-stable. …