be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …

types, we find that the optimal contract may be very simple, paying the supervisor a flat wage independent of his type and … his evaluation of the agent's effort. Such a contract induces the neutral type of supervisor to report the agent … performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of an optimal contract under informational asymmetries …

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not …

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not …

In this paper, firms engage in rent seeking in order to be assigned a governmental contract. We analyze how a change in … the contract length affects the firms' rent-seeking behavior. A longer contract leads to more rent seeking at a contract … assignment stage, as the firms value the contract higher. On the other hand, the contract has to be assigned less often, which of …

In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …