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The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers.

Che, Y.K.; Gale, I. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795244

Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions.

Gale, I.; Hausch, D. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795273

Entry Fees vs. Reserve Prices in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions.

Che, Y.K.; Gale, I. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795326

Revenue Non-Equivalence of Auctions with Budget- Constrained Buyers.

Che, Y.K.; Gale, I. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281506

Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions

Che, Y.K.; Gale, I. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281539

Price Dispersion in a Market with Advance Purchases.

Gale, I. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209378

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers.

Che, Y.K.; Gale, I. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200404

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers.

Che, Y.K.; Gale, I. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996

This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling an indivisible good to consumers who may be budget-constrained. Unlike the case where buyers are not budget constrained, a single posted price is not typically optimal. An optimal mechanism generally consists of a continuum of lotteries indexed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200406

Sales to Budget-Constrained Buyers: Single-Payer Versus Multi-Payer.

Che, Y.K.; Gale, I. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200433