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Chapter 10. Civic Capital as the Missing Link

Guiso, Luigi; Sapienza, Paola; Zingales, Luigi - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 417-480). 2011

This chapter reviews the recent debate about the role of social capital in economics. We argue that all the difficulties this concept has encountered in economics are due to a vague and excessively broad definition. For this reason, we restrict social capital to the set of values and beliefs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025693

Trust, values and false consensus

Butler, Jeffrey V.; Giuliano, Paola; Guiso, Luigi - 2012

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate … one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that … individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010289911

Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2011

This paper presents a complete survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124577

A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2012

We study strategies with one–period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games. A strategy has one–period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period. We show that if players are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097029

An Interior-Point Path-Following Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2020

Subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies (SSPE) is the most important solution concept used in applications of stochastic games, which makes it imperative to develop efficient numerical methods to compute an SSPE. For this purpose, this paper develops an interior-point path-following...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840979

Individual Upper Semicontinuity and Subgame Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Games with Almost Perfect Information

Flesch, János - 2019

We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894605

Adaptive Learning in Weighted Network Games

Bayer, Péter - 2017

This paper studies adaptive learning in the class of weighted network games. This class of games includes applications like research and development within interlinked firms, crime within social networks, the economics of pollution, and defense expenditures within allied nations. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944776

Perfect Information Games Where Each Player Acts Only Once

Cingiz, Kutay - 2016

We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978208

Best Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2015

We consider n–player perfect information games with payoff functions having a finite image. We do not make any further assumptions, so in particular we refrain from making assumptions on the cardinality or the topology of the set of actions and assumptions like continuity or measurability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020588

Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2014

We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060916