Showing 1 - 10 of 12
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009319692
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323072
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548065
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling and excessive trust in one sender/one receiver cheap talk games with an essentially unique and babbling equilibrium. We extend this setup by adding a second sender into the play and study the behavior of the players both theoretically and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110555
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500188
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009306849
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365517
This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431852
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in sender-receiver games. We show that this phenomenon is robust to the random intervention of a truthful regulator. In addition, intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers while the overall percentage of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014172114
Being the leader in a group often involves making risky decisions that affect the payoffs of all members, and the decision to take this responsibility in a group is endogenous in many contexts. In this paper, we experimentally study: (1) the willingness of men and women to make risky decisions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684717