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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946934
post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … if the buyer's bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024680
post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … if the buyer's bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439677
post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … if the buyer’s bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496962
-only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition …). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is particularly costly, and … if the buyer's bargaining position is strong. Moreover, negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596132
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482036
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976063
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011941699
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009656186
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658107