Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 96
Cover Image
Silent interests and all-pay auctions
Konrad, Kai A. - 2005
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261198
Cover Image
Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions
Konrad, Kai A. - 2005
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296367
Cover Image
Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions
Konrad, Kai A. - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Freie Universität … - 2005
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533529
Cover Image
Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions
Konrad, Kai A. - 2021
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318526
Cover Image
Merger and collusion in contests
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2001
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367922
Cover Image
Merger and collusion in contests
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2001
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307019
Cover Image
Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations
Holmberg, Pär; Newbery, David; Ralph, Daniel - 2009
In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320261
Cover Image
Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations
Holmberg, Pär; Newbery, David; Ralph, Daniel - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2009
In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025457
Cover Image
Electricity markets : designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Holmberg, Pär; Wolak, Frank A. - 2015
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410462
Cover Image
The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions
Holmberg, Pär; Newbery, David M. G. - 2009
electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the …-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format, setting the reservation price, the rationing rule, and … restrictions on the offer curves in wholesale electricity auctions. -- Wholesale electricity markets ; supply function equilibria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003895566