This article investigates the impact on economic performance of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government with both distributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without...

The paper incorporates three institutional design features into a Kydland-Prescott, Barro-Gordon monetary policy game. It shows that goal-independence and goal-transparency (an explicit inflation target) at the central bank are substitute ‘commitment technologies’ that reduce inflation and...

Conventional wisdom has it that increasing price or exchange rate uncertainty will depress investment. Using the Dixit-Pindyck model, we find that there are situations where this does happen; and situations where it does not – i.e. increasing uncertainty leads to more investment. It depends...

A popular suggestion among emerging or transition economies is to 'dollarize' or 'euro-ize'; that is to adopt the currency of a larger, richer neighbour in order to import the monetary discipline and financial stability of that neighbour. This paper examines the pros and cons of that suggestion...

This Paper analyses the interaction between a common monetary policy and differentiated labour market institutions. We develop a model of a two country monetary union. In each country, labour market institutions are distinguished by the degree of centralization in wage bargaining. In each...

Price and output level convergence between new member states and the existing EU necessarily implies inflation and growth divergence for many years to come. That complicates the conditions for accession to the euro. In this Paper, we focus on debt dynamics for the eight new member states from...

The Treaty of Maastricht requires that by 1 January 1999, at the latest, there shall be a nucleus of a monetary union. The issue of monetary union must therefore rest on the presumption that a small ‘credible’ group of countries that fulfils the convergence criteria will be able to adopt a...

The literature argues that the benefits of an independent Central Bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary...

This paper examines the potential consequences of imposing a ‘stability pact’ on the fiscal convergence criteria for monetary union. Various versions of the stability pact are possible. We examine the consequences of reducing the target deficit ratio to 1% and of refundable fines for those...

The literature has often commented on, but seldom explicitly analysed, the effects of a lack of transparency in monetary policy. Using a standard theoretical model where there are also opportunities for fiscal intervention, we argue that the effects of a lack of transparency will be very...