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Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives

Danilov, Anastasia; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Harbring, Christine - 2019

the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011997551

Danilov, Anastasia; Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2014

benchmark is tested in an experiment. Furthermore, we provide the first clean one-shot experimental test of the Lazear and Rosen … (1981) tournament model. In a second experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of corporate value statements to encourage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457828

Helping in Teams

Danilov, Anastasia; Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011105057

Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - 2003

We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström?s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents? unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261580

Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - 2003

experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261601

Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2004

-world organizations we employ a controlled experiment. Our data provide clear evidence that agents? behavior is not only guided by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262080

Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis

Kräkel, Matthias; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Harbring, Christine; … - 2004

In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263109