managers to adopt policies that benefit shareholders in the long run. Further analysis robustly validates the results …

. The results are consistent with the notion that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force … managers to disgorge more cash through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic managers. We …

evidence reveals an inverse relation between the strength of shareholder rights and debt maturity. We contend that managers of …

The quiet life hypothesis posits that entrenched managers are well-insulated from removal and thus prefer to enjoy a … powerful takeover defense that enables inefficient managers to evade the discipline of the takeover market, thereby … exacerbating managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). We find that managers entrenched by the staggered board adopt …

shareholders a particularly compelling story about why a stock's fundamental value and the current price differ …

managers' job security, reduce managerial myopia, and thus induce managers to exercise less short-term transitory accounting …

10.67%. Our results corroborate the premise that staggered boards insulate self-interested managers from market …

Because religious piety induces individuals to be more honest and risk-averse, it makes managers less likely to exploit … shareholders, thereby mitigating the agency conflict and potentially influencing governance arrangements. We exploit the variation …