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Not all firms that intend to go private do so successfully. A number of management buyouts are announced but subsequently withdrawn. It is documented in this study that the stock market reacts negatively to MBO withdrawal announcement. This adverse effect, however, is alleviated in firms where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120151
, consistent with the notion that managers tend to be myopic when more exposed to hostile takeover threats, making investments that …Exploiting two novel measures of innovation efficiency and takeover vulnerability, we explore the effect of the … takeover market on corporate innovation. Our results reveal that a more active takeover market stifles innovation considerably …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219798
mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability … primarily based on state legislation, we investigate the effect of the takeover market on board characteristics with special … emphasis on board gender diversity.Design/methodology/approach – We exploit a novel measure of takeover vulnerability based on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239732
Exploiting a unique measure of takeover vulnerability principally based on state legislations, we investigate how … corporate carbon reduction efforts are influenced by the takeover market, which is widely regarded as a crucial instrument of … external corporate governance. Our results show that more takeover exposure brings about significantly greater efforts to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244868
Agency theory suggests that CEOs view dividends unfavorably because dividend payouts deprive them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, we find that an increase in CEO power by one standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926278
Motivated by agency theory, we explore how independent directors view managerial risk-taking incentives using a natural experiment. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous shock that raised board independence. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896321
Grounded in agency theory, this paper investigates the effect of board independence on managerial ownership. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock that raises board independence. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012942295
The literature offers no clear evidence on the effect of independent directors on firm value. We argue that, during stressful times, firms may need more and better expert advice to navigate a crisis. Outside independent directors can provide such advice. So, the role of independent directors may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945479
deviation reduces CSR investments by about 8.22%. Further analysis shows that managers raised CSR investments during the crisis …, consistent with the risk-mitigation view, where managers invest in CSR to reduce their risk exposure. However, managers appear to … of the CSR investments during the crisis is motivated by managers' own risk preference. Additional robustness checks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012825484
Prior research shows that powerful CEOs can exacerbate the agency conflict, resulting in adverse corporate outcomes. Exploiting an exogenous shock introduced by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we explore whether board independence mitigates CEO power. Based on difference-in-difference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009860