games with non-empty cores this means that the core can be reached via a bounded sequence of blocks. …

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

staying with the original outcome with the risk of deviating. Employing this idea to the core leads to a new concept that we … call the risk-based core. We introduce this concept and discuss its properties. We find an inclusion relation between cores … yields many of the familiar inclusion relations as corollaries, while the inclusion of the optimistic core in the optimistic …

that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core. …

does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical …

cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this …

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core …, a generalisation of the core to such games. In order to extend past results limited to totally recursive … remaining players: the stability of core payoff configurations is ensured by a combination of the pessimism of players going for …

axiomatization of the Shapley value that the requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity are …

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …