In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach as initiated by Güth and Yaari (1992). It allows to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate...

Adopting the indirect evolutionary approach, we show that it might be beneficial for firms on a heterogeneous market not only to care for their profits but also for their respective customers' welfare. -- evolutionary stability ; customer orientation ; heterogenous market ; duopoly

In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach initiated by Guth and Yaari. It allows us to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate symmetric as...

We study interfirm competition on a product market where effort decisions are delegated to the firms' workers. Intrafirm organization is captured by a principal-multiagent framework where firm owners implement alternative compensation schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation...

We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competition on a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and implementing tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higher incentive intensity, higher efforts and output...

We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for...