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Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy
Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel - 2011
We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009407577
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Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?
Konrad, Kai A. - 2014
When politicians negotiate in international climate conventions they may suffer from incomplete information about each other's preferences about reaching an agreement. As is known, this may cause failure to reach an efficient cooperative agreement. We study the role of the clean development...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044667
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Does a clean development mechanism facilitate international environmental agreements?
Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 69 (2018) 4, pp. 837-851
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011939473
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The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
Konrad, Kai A. (contributor);  … - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715168
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The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Daniel J. - In: Economics letters 103 (2009) 2, pp. 84-86
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003846726
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The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenrock, Dan - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675941
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The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Daniel J. - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003686130
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Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013
members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguishing between … coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition … group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009691706
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Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately : The Strategic Power of Coalitions Where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information
Konrad, Kai A. - 2013
members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguishing between … coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition … group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087729
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Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately : The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information
Konrad, Kai A. - 2013
members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguishing between … coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition … group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089384