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Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information ; conference paper

Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013

fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338972

Bargaining with incomplete information : evolutionary stability in finite populations

Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - In: Journal of mathematical economics 65 (2016), pp. 118-131

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665695

Hanging together or hanged separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2014

group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012053740

The better route to global tax coordination : gradualism or multilateralism?

Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel - 2018

lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about … tax coordination under complete and incomplete information. We identify the conditions for multilateral negotiations to be … bargaining. Under plausible conditions, full-scale global coordination is least likely to emerge if the negotiations take place …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011924656

Federal tax autonomy and the limits of cooperation

Kessing, Sebastian; Konrad, Kai A.; Kotsogiannēs, Chrēstos - In: Journal of urban economics 59 (2006) 2, pp. 317-329

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003309638

Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013

group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724695

Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013

group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009691706

Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy

Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel - 2011

We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009407577

Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war

Konrad, Kai A. (contributor); … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003218121

Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war

Konrad, Kai A. (contributor); … - 2005

We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greater resources wins. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003202472